with Dimitris Papanikolaou, Jonathan Rothbaum, and Lawrence Schmidt
Conditionally Accepted at the American Economic Review
Abstract
Using U.S. administrative data on worker earnings, we show that increases in risk premia lead to lower labor earnings, particularly for lower-paid workers. These declines are primarily driven by job separations. We build an equilibrium model of labor market search that quantitatively replicates the observed heterogeneity in labor market dynamics across worker earnings levels. Our findings underscore the role of time-varying risk premia as a key driver of labor market fluctuations and highlight the importance of both the job creation and the job destruction margins in understanding the heterogeneity in worker outcomes over the business cycle.
with Jonathan Parker, Antoinette Schoar, and Duncan Simester
Journal of Finance, December 2022, 77(6), 3191–3247
Abstract
Using proprietary financial data on millions of households, we show that likely-Republicans increased the equity share and market beta of their portfolios following the 2016 presidential election, while likely-Democrats rebalanced into safe assets. We provide evidence that this behavior was driven by investors interpreting public information based on different models of the world. We use detailed controls to rule out the main nonbelief-based channels such as income hedging needs, preferences, and local economic exposures. These findings are driven by a small share of investors making big changes, and are stronger among investors who trade more ex ante.
with Dimitris Papanikolaou and Lawrence Schmidt, July 2026
Abstract
We study how aggregate financial conditions shape the extent of firm insurance and, through it, labor income risk. In a directed search model with dynamic wage contracts and two-sided limited commitment, firms partially insure workers against idiosyncratic shocks, but this insurance erodes when risk premia rise and employment relationships lose value. The model predicts that the pass-through of firm shocks to worker earnings rises in bad times, especially for lower-paid workers near the separation margin, which is consistent with new evidence we document using U.S. administrative data. It also reproduces a broad set of features of earnings risk across workers and over time. We use the model to quantify objects the earnings process alone cannot identify: substantial welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk, high private discount rates on human capital, and large welfare gains from recession-contingent labor market transfers.
Financial Advisors and Retirees’ Risk-Taking [draft available upon request]
with Allison Cole, Alessandro Previtero, and Noah Stoffman, November 2025
Recipient of the TIAA Institute & Boettner/Pension Research Council (PRC) Partnership Grant on Behavioral Finance and Retirement